David Anderson and Kristine Anderson v. Matthew Kriser : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
David Anderson and Kristine Anderson v. Matthew
Kriser : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Jeffs; Randall L. Jeffs; Jeffs and Jeffs, PC; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
Stephen Quesenberry, Charles L. Perschon; Hill; Johnson and Shmutz LC; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Anderson v. Kriser, No. 20080989 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1335
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID ANDERSON and KRISTINE 
ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MATTHEW KRISER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20080989 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Samuel McVey 
MR. ROBERT L. JEFFS 
MR. RANDALL L. JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile (801) 373-8878 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
CHARLES L. PERSCHON (11149) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
RiverView Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Facsimile (801) 375-3865 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants .... __ 
UTAH APPELLATE COU 
JUL 1 7 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID ANDERSON and KRISTINE 
ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MATTHEW KRISER, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Case No. 20080989 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Samuel McVey 
MR. ROBERT L. JEFFS 
MR. RANDALL L. JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile (801) 373-8878 
A ttorneysfor Defendant/Appellee 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
CHARLES L. PERSCHON (11149) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
RiverView Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Facsimile (801) 375-3865 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. THE SOLE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS WHETHER 
DEFENDANT KNEW ABOUT THE GEOTECH 
REPORT, AND NOT WHETHER HE HAD A 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE IT 1 
II. WHEN KRISER SOLD THE LOT TO THE 
ANDERSONS, HE KNEW A GEOTECHNICAL 
STUDY HAD BEEN COMPLETED 
III. DEVELOPERS, LIKE KRISER, ARE CHARGED 
WITH THE EXISTENCE AND CONTENTS OF 
GEOTECHNICAL REPORTS, AND HE HAD A DUTY 
TO DISCLOSE IT TO THE ANDERSONS 
IV. KRISER PERSONALLY SIGNED THE 
"OFFER TO PURCHASE"; HE WAS NOT ACTING 
IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY 
V. THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERSEDING INTERVENING 
CAUSE DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE KRISER, THE 
DEVELOPER, DID NOT CONVEY THE PROPERTY 
TO A BUILDER-CONTRACTOR 8 
CONCLUSION 9 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH CASES 
Fennellv. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339 4-5 
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919 5-6, 8 
Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47', 143 P.3d 283 5-6 
iii 
ARGUMENT 
L THE SOLE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS WHETHER DEFENDANT KNEW 
ABOUT THE GEOTECH REPORT, AND NOT WHETHER HE HAD A 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE IT. 
The only issue in this case is whether Defendant Matthew Kriser knew about the 
1997 Earthtec Geotech Report ("Geotech Report"). Indeed, that was the scope and the 
lone holding of the trial court in ruling on summary judgment: that the Andersons did not 
"provide any evidence that [Defendant] Matthew Kriser knew that the real property in 
question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the construction of a residence/5 {Judgment, 
Add. 1 to Appellants' Opening Br.), thus, the court granted summary judgment for 
Kriser. 
The issue is not, as Kriser argues, whether Kriser owed a duty to disclose the 
Geotech Report. (Appellee's Br. 5, 10-16.) This argument is a red herring, and the 
Andersons did not brief it or argue it on appeal or even address it in their opening brief, 
so the Court should disregard it. 
Therefore, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Andersons, it is clear 
that Kriser knew about the existence of the Geotech Report. Thus, the trial court should 
not have granted summary judgment to Kriser. 
When the trial court granted summary judgment for Kriser. its judgment contained 
one—and only one—holding as its basis for summary judgment: that the Andersons did 
not "provide any evidence that [Defendant] Matthew Kriser knew that the real property in 
question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the construction of a residence/' {Judgment. 
Add 1 to Appellants' Opening Br.). Contrary to Kriser's red herring argument, the trial 
1 
court did not hold that Kriser did not owe a duty to disclose the report to the Andersons. 
In fact, the trial court did not address or speak to that issue at all. The court's only 
holding was that Kriser did not know about the Geotech Report, and therefore, summary 
judgment in his favor was proper. 
Now, however, Kriser argues not only that he did not know about the Geotech 
Report, but that he did not owe a duty to disclose the Geotech Report. The Court should 
wholly disregard this argument because the trial court did not so much as mention 
whether Kriser owed that duty to the Andersons, let alone did it base its ruling on that 
reasoning. As a result of the trial court's narrow holding, the Andersons did not raise that 
issue on appeal or brief it in their opening brief. (Appellants' Br. 1.) Kriser, however, 
briefed it at length. But because this Court does not consider issues not raised on appeal, 
the Court should wholly disregard this argument. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill 
P.2d 1033, 1039 n.7 (Utah 1989) (holding that because an argument was "not raised on 
appeal," the supreme court did not consider it). 
The only issue is whether Kriser knew about the Geotech Report, and viewing the 
facts most favorably to the Andersons, it is clear that he did. 
IL WHEN KRISER SOLD THE LOT TO THE ANDERSONS, HE KNEW A 
GEOTECHNICAL STUDY HAD BEEN COMPLETED. 
As Kriser rightly points out, to overcome summary judgment, the Andersons had 
to show a disputed fact concerning Kriser's knowledge of the Geotech Report. Viewing 
the facts in a light most favorable to the Andersons, it is clear that there is a disputed 
2 
issue of material fact whether Kriser knew about the Geotech Report. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment for Kriser. 
Kriser argues that the "record . . . is completely devoid" that Kriser knew a 
geotechnical study had to be completed. (Appellee's Br. 7.) But Kriser testified in his 
deposition that he knew the city required a geotechnical study to be completed before the 
streets could be put in. (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:20-21.) In other words, he knew that 
when he sold the lot to the Andersons, a geotechnical study had to have been completed. 
This fact alone justifies reversal of the summary judgment. 
But Kriser made additional incriminating statements in his deposition. He 
clarified his understanding of performing a geotechnical report for the subdivision. He 
stated that he "knew that [a geotechnical study] had to be done before the city would 
allow us to develop [the subdivision].55 (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:21-23.) 
So in spite of his insistence to the contrary, Kriser knew that the city required a 
geotechnical study before it would have even allowed Kriser to develop the subdivision 
at all. Therefore, Kriser had to have been aware that a geotechnical analysis had been 
completed by the time he sold the lot to the Andersons. 
And Kriser also admitted that it was his "general practice" to perform a 
geotechnical evaluation before constructing the roads in a development. (R. at 94.) 
These are at least three separate statements showing that Kriser knew that a 
geotechnical report had to be completed before developing a subdivision. These 
statements alone justify reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment because 
they create a disputed issue of fact on the trial court's singular holding, i.e., whether 
3 
Kriser knew a geotechnical study had been done for the Andersons' subdivision. Clearly, 
from his own deposition testimony, he did, otherwise, he would not have been able to sell 
the Andersons their lot and home. 
Next, Kriser cites Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339, for the 
proposition that the plaintiff-homeowner could not recover against the defendant-
developer because the homeowner (whose home was subject to a landslide because of 
collapsible soils) did not "show that the seller had knowledge of the defects shown in a 
soils study . . . ." (Appellee's Br. 7.) 
Fennell is factually distinguishable, and Kriser misstates this holding from Fennell 
to mold it for use in this case. In Fennell, the soils study did not show any defects in the 
lot, which is why the plaintiff-homeowner could not charge the defendant-developers 
with knowledge about bad soil—there was no evidence of bad soil. 
In Fennell, the defendant-developer moved for summary judgment on the theory 
that the geotechnical report—the equivalent of the Geotech Report in this case—did not 
find any soil problems or landslide potential in the plaintiff-homeowner's lot. Id. at 343. 
The supreme court held that the homeowner's claim failed because "there were no facts 
presented to show that [the defendant-developers] knew of a possible landslide condition 
on [the homeowner's lot]." Id. 
In fact, the plaintiff-homeowner's argument that the defendant-homeowner knew 
or should have known about landslide potential on the lot was blatantly refuted by the 
soils expert, who conducted the soils report on the homeowner's lot and who testified that 
there were no soil problems or no landslide potential on the homeowner's lot. Id. 
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Therefore, the homeowner's claim rightly failed, because the homeowner was trying to 
charge the defendant-developers with knowledge they not only did not have, but with 
knowledge that contradicted the knowledge the defendant-developers did have (the soils 
expert, who conducted the soils tests and issued the report, found no collapsible soils or 
landslide potential on the homeowner's lot). 
In contrast, in this case, there is a soils report that warns about soil problems: the 
1997 Earthtec Geotech Report, which was prepared for use in developing the subdivision. 
And unlike the geotechnical report in Fennell, the Geotech Report in this case warned 
about soil problems in the development and provided recommendations to mitigate 
against soil problems. And it is already established that Kriser knew a geotechnical 
report had to be completed before developing a subdivision. Therefore, Kriser, as a 
developer of the property, was charged with knowledge of the report, which is addressed 
in Section III infra. 
IIL DEVELOPERS, LIKE KRISER, ARE CHARGED WITH THE 
EXISTENCE AND CONTENTS OF GEOTECHNICAL REPORTS, AND 
HE HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE IT TO THE ANDERSONS.1 
Kriser admitted that he was the developer of the Andersons' lot. (R. at 204; Kriser 
Dep. 4:16-17.) Therefore, under Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, and it 
progeny, like Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, H 24 143 P.3d 283, 288, 
Kriser had 
1
 The Andersons argue that, as noted supra, whether Kriser had a duty to disclose 
the existence and/or contents of the Geotech Report is irrelevant, because that was not the 
basis for the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for Kriser, and therefore, 
the Andersons did not appeal that issue. Even so, out of an abundance of caution, and 
because Kriser raised it in his brief, the Andersons address it here. 
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a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are 
suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house, 
and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or 
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such 
residential building. 
Smith, 94 P.3d at 924 (emphasis added) (citation and quotations omitted). 
Under Kriser's theory, it was not reasonable for him, as the developer of the 
subdivision, to know that the Geotech Report warned against soil problems. That is the 
only argument through which he can escape liability under existing law as pronounced by 
the supreme court in Smith and Yazd. The Andersons take the contrary position that it is 
reasonable for Kriser—as the developer—to know about the 1997 Earthtec geotechnical 
report that warns against soil problems in the development. Otherwise, a developer can 
satisfy his duty to obtain the geotechnical report, but exercise willful blindness, never 
read it, and escape liability because he chose to ignore it. Surely that is not the standard 
the Utah Supreme Court meant to promulgate in Smith. 
Moreover, Kriser admitted in his deposition that his "current occupation" was as a 
u[b]uilder/developer." (R. at 204; Kriser Dep. 4:16-17.) And as a developer, the 
pronouncements from Smith undoubtedly apply to Kriser. 
In addition, Kriser knew a geotechnical analysis had to be completed before the 
city would allow the subdivision to be developed. (R. at 204; Kriser Dep. 19:20-23.) So 
when Kriser sold the Andersons their lot, he must have known that a soils report had been 
done. Yet he took no steps to comply with his duty by telling the Andersons about the 
Geotech Report or its contents. 
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Kriser, the developer, was in the best position to protect the Andersons—the 
unsophisticated buyer—against bad soils and the trouble bad soil would bring. He 
admitted in his deposition that he was a developer. As such, the Smith duties to ensure 
that the Andersons' lot was suitable for an average home, and to disclose any condition 
that he should have known would make the lot unsuitable for such a home, applies. 
Kriser did not follow those duties. Therefore, the Court should reverse summary 
judgment for Kriser. 
IV. KRISER PERSONALLY SIGNED THE "OFFER TO PURCHASE"; HE 
WAS NOT ACTING IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY.2 
Personal liability extends to Kriser because he personally—not in a representative 
capacity—signed the "Offer to Purchase," which the Andersons presented to him, as 
''Seller.5' Therefore, Kriser is personally liable for failing to disclose the soils 
information. 
The "Offer to Purchase" clearly provided a line marked "Sellers Signature" [sic]. 
(Add. 2 to Appellants' opening Br.) Kriser signed his name on that signature line, and he 
did not include any language such as "principal of Country Living Development, LLC," 
which would have established liability for the entity rather than Kriser personally. 
Moreover, just above the signature line, it states that "Seller accepts the forgoing 
[sic] offer on the terms and conditions specified above." Directly under that language, 
Kriser signed his name on the "Sellers Signature" line. 
2
 Again, this issue is raised by Kriser (Appellee's Br. 11-14), but it was not a basis 
for the trial court's ruling, it was not raised in the Andersons' opening brief, and it is 
irrelevant to whether Kriser knew about the existence of the Geotech Report. The 
Andersons address it out of an abundance of caution. 
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It cannot be disputed that Kriser, not Country Living Development, LLC, signed 
the Offer to Purchase as the seller of the lot. Therefore, personal liability extends to 
Kriser without the need to pierce the corporate veil, as Kriser argues. 
V. THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERSEDING INTERVENING CAUSE DOES NOT 
APPLY BECAUSE KRISER, THE DEVELOPER, DID NOT CONVEY THE 
PROPERTY TO A BUILDER-CONTRACTOR.3 
Finally, Kriser argues that the products liability tort doctrine of superseding cause 
applies to relieve Kriser of his duty to disclose material information to a home buyer. 
This is a misstatement of the law. 
Kriser relies on Smith for the proposition that the "failure of a builder-contractor to 
ensure adequate compaction, obtain a soils test, or review the soils report filed with the 
city severs the duties and potential liablitiy of previous owners" is not accurate. 
(Appellee's Br. 15.) Kriser quote from Smith: "Where a developer conveys property to a 
residential contractor . . . ." Smith, 2004 UT 55, ^  21 (emphasis added). In this case, 
Kriser did not convey property to a residential contractor, which would have purported to 
extinguish Kriser's duties as a developer (as established in Smith). Rather, it is not 
disputed that Kriser conveyed the property to the homeowner—to the Andersons—thus, 
Kriser's duties as the developer were not interrupted. 
Therefore, the doctrine of superseding cause does not apply to relieve Kriser of 
liability. 
* Just as with several of the other issues raised by Kriser, this issue is raised by 
Kriser (Appellee's Br. 14-16), but it was not a basis for the trial court's ruling, it was not 
raised in the Andersons' opening brief, and it is irrelevant to whether Kriser knew about 
the existence of the Geotech Report. The Andersons address it out of an abundance of 
caution. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment for Kriser and remand for trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of July 2009. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
ft 
Stephen Quesenbbrry 
Charles L. Perschqi 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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